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TRUSTS-TRUSTEES-INVESTMENT DUTIES OF TRUSTEES AND
THE PROBLEM OF UNDULY-CONSERVATIVE TRUST INVESTMENTS-

A few years ago a New Jersey court, in the case of Commercial
Trust Co. v. Barnard,1 was asked, in effect, to surcharge a trustee
for being overly conservative in investing the res of a discretionary
trust. The income beneficiaries and remaindermen alleged that
the trustee had breached its duty by failing to exercise its discretionary power to convert investments in low-yield government
1

27 N.J. 332, 142 A.2d 865 (1958).
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securities into more diversified higher-yield investments, despite a
decline in yield from 14.27 percent in 1927 to 1.51 percent in
1955. Although recovery was denied, the court did not foreclose
the possibility that a trustee may be surcharged, on the theory of
breach of duty, for pursuing an unduly-conservative investment
policy. In exonerating the trustee, the court emphasized the fact
that the investment policy followed was actually quite reasonable,
since the high tax bracket of the beneficiaries made it advisable
that investments in their behalf be in tax-exempt securities.
In the more recent case of In re Mayo, 2 a Minnesota court was
asked by a trust beneficiary to allow the trustee to deviate from
the express terms of a trust, created in 1917, which prohibited investment in corporate stock. The court granted the trustees the
right to invest a reasonable amount of the fund in common stock
if the trustees felt such investments were advisable. In reaching
its decision, the court took note of economic conditions, including
a fifty percent decline in the purchasing power of the trust corpus
since the settlor's death in 1~39. The court's primary justification
for its action was the belief that failure to allow deviation would
frustrate the dominant intent of the settlor to preserve the trust
principal.
Though the two cases described above dealt with admittedly
different areas of trust law, both were concerned with a common
problem. In both cases it was alleged that the investment policies
followed by the trustee, although valid at the time of the establishment of the trust, were no longer fully exploiting the investment potential of the trust, resulting in detriment to the beneficiaries. As such1 both cases indicate that trust law has not yet
formulated a means of protecting beneficiaries against undulyconservative trust investments, which may be as costly to them as
an overly-speculative investment policy.
This comment will first examine the trustee's investment duties, particularly those relating to investments in securities, and
then consider the factors which have brought to the fore the problem of the unduly-conservative trust investment. On the basis of
this examination, it may be determined whether the present law
in this area provides the beneficiary with adequate safeguards
against the unduly-conservative investment. Finally, assuming
such safeguards have not been provided, some suggested remedies
2 259 Minn. 91, 105 N.W.2d 900 (1960). Cf. Bliss v. Bliss, 126 N.J. Eq. 308, 8 A.2d 705
(Ch. 1939), afj'd, 127 N.J. Eq. 20, 11 A.2d 13 (Ct. Err. & App. 1940).
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for this situation will be considered, including the possible imposition of a duty upon trustees to invest at least part of the trust
funds in common stock.
I.

TRUSTEES' INVESTMENT DUTIES

A. In General
The trustee must invest the trust res in accordance with the
expressed intent of the settlor or testator; 8 deviation will be sanctioned only in certain emergency situations.4 However, due to
the greatly increased use of the discretionary trust,5 trustees frequently find few investment limitations imposed by the trust instrument itself. In such a situation, the trustee is required to act
as would a reasonably or ordinarily prudent man in making his
investment choices, and his failure to act as such will render him
liable to the trust's beneficiaries. 6 Both decisional and statutory
law have provided guidelines within which trustees must stay in
order to satisfy this rather vague standard of reasonableness and
thereby avoid the possibility of surcharge.
In applying the reasonable man standard, courts have maintained that a trustee has not fulfilled his obligations by merely
acting as would a reasonable man investing his own money; rather,
the trustee must act as a reasonable man investing the money of
another. 7 The clear implication of this distinction is the belief
that a prudent man is likely to incur fewer risks with assets entrusted to his care than he would with his own personal funds. 8
It is well settled that in judging the reasonableness of an investment the circumstances at the time of investment are to be controlling, and hindsight may not be employed to second-guess the
trustee and burden him with liability. 9 Despite this doctrine, it
is hardly likely that hindsight is not a prominent consideration in
s See Vest v. Bialson, 365 Mo. ll03, 293 S.W.2d 369 (1956); Davis v. Davis Trust Co.,
106 W. Va. 228, 145 S.E. 588 (1928).
4 See, e.g., In re Mayo, 259 Minn, 91, 105 N.W.2d 900 (1960); Bliss v. Bliss, 126 N.J.
Eq. 308, 8 A.2d 705 (Ch. 1939), aff'd, 127 N.J. Eq. 20, II A.2d 13 (Ct. Err. &: App. 1940).
I> See Stevenson, Why the Prudent Man?, 7 VAND. L. REv. 74 (1953).
o See Mattocks v. Moulton, 84 Me. 545, 24 Atl. 1004 (1892); Springfield Safe Deposit
&: Trust Co. v. First Unitarian Soc'y, 293 Mass. 480, 200 N.E. 541 (1936); Rand v. McKittrick, 346 Mo. 466, 142 S.W.2d 29 (1940).
7 See In re Estate of Cook, 20 Del. Ch. 123, 171 Atl. 730 (Ch. 1934); In re Buhl's
Estate, 2II Mich. 124, 178 N.W. 651 (1920). But cf. Fox v. Harris, 141 Md. 495, II9 Atl.
256 (1922); Gray v. Lynch, 33 Md. (8 Gill.) 403 (1849).
s See Mattocks v. Moulton, 84 Me. 545, 24 Atl. 1004 (1892); In re Buhl's Estate, supra
note 7; Miller v. Pender, 93 N.H. 1, 34 A.2d 663 (1943).
o Sec Bowker v. Pierce, 130 Mass. 262 (1881); In re Beebe's Estate, 52 N.Y.S.2d 736
(Surr. Ct. 1943).
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the examination of unprofitable investments which were made
years before the time of the trial.

B. Statutory Influences
Legislation has also played a significant part in delineating the
permissible scope of trust investments.10 Such statutes are in effect
a codification of the reasonable man rule; that is, they represent
legislative attempts to define, or at least provide some guidelines
for, the type of investments which a trustee may permissibly
make. The statutes may be broadly broken down into two categories.
In the first of these fall what are commonly called "legal list"
statutes.11 These statutes attempt to enumerate specifically those
types of investments in which a reasonable trustee may safely invest trust funds. 12 Such investments do not, however, free the
trustee from his duty to act as a reasonable man in determining
which of the items on the legal list he should select.18 While some
"legal list" jurisdictions have treated investments outside the list
as a per se breach of duty,14 others have imposed liability only if
the trustee has not acted as a prudent man in making such investments.15 Of course, the settlor may free the trustee of the restraints
of the statutory legal list by a clear expression of his intent to do
so. 16 In such a situation, the trustee's duty is, once again, only to
act as a prudent man, according to the common-law standard.
The most striking deficiency of the legal lists is their failure
to include common stock as a suitable investment, such absence
seemingly being attributable to the old English common-law docSee Stevenson, supra note 5, at 91-92, for a state-by-state breakdown of such statutes.
Legal list statutes are today in force in less than a dozen states. See Stevenson,
supra note 5, at 92.
12 E.g., IowA ConE § 682.23 (Supp. 1962), which provides that all money received by
a fiduciary to be invested be placed in the following types of securities: federal bonds;
federal bank bonds; state bonds; municipal bonds; real estate mortgage bonds; corporate
mortgages; railroad bonds; bonds guaranteed by railroads; bonds and debentures guaran•
teed by the federal government; stock in federal government instrumentalities; life, en•
dowment endorsement or annuity contracts of legal reserve life insurance companies authorized to do business in Iowa. See generally Note, Inadequacy of the Iowa Legal List
of Trust Investments, 36 IowA L. REv. 341 (1951).
18 See In re McCafferty's Will, 147 Misc. 179, 264 N.Y. Supp. 38 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
14 See In re McCafferty's Will, supra note 13; Estate of Herriman, 142 Misc. 164 (Surr.
Ct. 1931).
15 See First Nat'! Bank v. Hawley, 207 Ark. 587, 182 S.W.2d 194 (1944); In re
Estate of Cook, 20 Del. Ch. 123, 171 Atl. 730 (Ch. 1934); Falls v. Carruthers, 20 Tenn.
App. 681, 103 S.W.2d 605 (1937).
16 See Fox v. Harris, 141 Md. 495, 119 Atl. 256 (1922); In re McCafferty's Will,
147 Misc. 179, 264 N.Y. Supp. 38 (Surr. Ct. 1933); Estate of Herriman, 142 Misc. 164
(Surr. Ct. 1931). Cf. In re Carnell's Will, 260 App. Div. 287, 21 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1940).
10
11

1963]

COMMENTS

1549

trine that such investments were per se imprudent.17 This view
was early accepted by the New York courts and later codified
with the enactment in New York of a statutory legal list, which
served as a model for numerous other subsequent enactments of
lists. 18 However, since the mid-1930's there has been a steady movement away from legislative reliance on legal lists,19 primarily because of their relative inflexibility, whereby a trustee pursuant to
such statutes is effectively prohibited from adjusting to fluctuations
in economic conditions and to other changing circumstances.20
Paralleling the demise of legal list statutes has been the increased legislative recourse to the second general type of statutes
defining permissible trust investments, commonly referred to as
"prudent man" statutes.21 Such statutes, now in force in over
thirty states, represent codifications of the so-called Massachusetts
rule, first announced in 1830 in the landmark case of Harvard
College v. Amory,22 and subsequently followed judicially by a
handful of states in the nineteenth century.23 The Massachusetts
court in the Harvard College case refused to accept the theory
that stocks in manufacturing firms were inherently unsafe, and,
in so doing, departed from the English common-law requirement
that trust investments be in debt rather than in ownership interests.24 As to the trustee's investment duties, the court said:
"All that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, that he
shall conduct himself faithfully and exercise a sound discretion. He is to observe how men of prudence, discretion and
intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of their
17 See Gray v. Lynch, 33 Md. (8 Gill.) 403 (1849);

In re Camell's Will, supra note 16.

1s See King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76 (1869).
10 Between 1940 and 1953 approximately twenty-three states adopted "prudent man"
statutes in preference to the use of legal lists. See Stevenson, supra note 5, at 91-92.
20 See generally Note, supra note 12.
21 California's statute is representative of this category. CAL. CIV. ConE § 2261
provides: "In investing ••. a trustee shall exercise the judgment and care, under the
circumstances then prevailing, which men of prudence, discretion and intelligence
exercise in the management of their own affairs . . . considering the probable income,
as well as the probable safety of their capital.•.• [A] trustee is authorized to acquire
every kind of property, real, personal or mixed, and every kind of investment,
specifically including, but not by way of limitation, corporate obligations of every kind,
and stocks, preferred or common • • • ."
22 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830).
23 See, e.g., McCoy v. Horwitz, 62 Md. 183 (1884); Peckham v. Newton, 15 R.I. 321, 4
Atl. 758 (1886).
24 See cases cited in note 17 supra.
25 Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446, 461 (1830). It is interesting to
note that the New York court in King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76 (1869), used very similar
language.

1550

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

funds, considering the probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be invested."25
The advantages of this broad doctrine, over attempts to define
prudent investments more specifically by the use of such devices
as legal lists, were concisely outlined in the subsequent Massachusetts case of Kimball v. Whitney, 26 where the court stated:
"That is a comprehensive principle. It is wide in scope. It
is not limited to a particular time or a special neighborhood.
It is general and inclusive, so that while remaining itself fixed,
it may continue to be a safe guide under new financial institutions and business customs, changed commercial methods
and practices, altered monetary usages and investment combinations. It avoids the inflexibility of definite classification
of securities, it disregards the optimism of the promoter, and
eschews the exuberance of the speculator. It holds fast to
common sense and depends on practical experience. It is
susceptible of being adapted to whatever conditions may arise
in the evolution of society and the progress of civilization."27
Although the court in Kimball may have been guilty of some
overstatement, trustees and writers have generally agreed that the
flexibility of the Massachusetts rule makes it considerably more
useful than the legal lists.28
C. Specific Investment Duties
I. Diversification
In addition to the broad duty to act as a reasonable man, the
courts have formulated specific investment duties which are binding on the trustee. Among these is the duty to diversify trust investments, which is generally recognized in those states following
the Massachusetts rule.29 Courts following this rule have indicated there must be diversification among various classes of investments as well as within any one class.80 This duty is evidently
imposed in the hope that it will minimize the possibility of large
233 Mass. 321, 123 N.E. 665 (1919).
Id. at 331, 123 N.E. at 666.
See Chapman, A Changing Economy Brings New Problems of Trust Investment,
Trust Bull., Sept. 1949, p. 11; Comment, 39 CALIF. L. REv. 380 (1951); Note, 36 lowA.
L. REv. 341 (1951); Note, 1 RUTGERS L. REv. 130 (1947).
29 See Warren v. Pazolt, 203 Mass. 328, 89 N.E. 381 (1909); In re Davis, 183 Mass.
499, 67 N.E. 604 (1903); In re Dickinson, 152 Mass. 184, 25 N.E. 99 (1890); The
Pennsylvania Co. v. Gillmore, 142 N.J. Eq. 27, 59 A.2d 24 (Ch. 1948).
80 See In re Dickinson, supra note 29; The Pennsylvania Co. v. Gillmore, supra noto
29.
26
21
28
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losses through the failure of only one of the investments in an
entire portfolio. Although the courts have never adopted a specific
maximum percentage, the cases as a whole indicate that courts acknowledging and enforcing the duty of diversification will treat
the investment of greater than twenty to twenty-five percent of the
trust assets in one form as prima fade evidence of breach of duty31
which may, however, be rebutted by evidence that the failure to
diversify further was reasonable under the circumstances.32
In North Adams Nat'l Bank v. Curtiss, 33 the court refused to
surcharge the trustee for retaining stock in A. T. & T., General
Electric and First National Bank of Boston, despite the fact these
stocks constituted a very large percentage of the trust estate. In
reaching its decision, the court noted the fine reputation of the
stocks involved and the fact they had originally been placed in
the trust at its creation by the settlor. The court further pointed
to the unfavorable tax consequences which would have occurred
had the trustee sold the stock. The force of this decision may be
lessened by the presence of an exculpatory clause in the trust instrument, though the court did not treat this fact alone as controlling.
At least two courts adhering to legal list statutes have refused
to impose a duty of diversification upon trustees where the investments entered into were authorized according to the statutory
list. 34 The approach of these courts seems to be that trustees
should not be restrained from taking full advantage of investments
which the legal list and independent investigation indicate are
sound. They repeatedly quote Andrew Carnegie's statement, "Put
all your eggs in one basket and watch the basket."

2. Loyalty
While the courts may differ as to diversification, it is uniformly
accepted that a trustee has a duty of loyalty to the trust beneficiaries which is breached by engaging in any self-dealing with the
property held in trust; 35 that is, the trustee may not bring his own
31

See In re Davis, 183 Mass. 499, 67 N.E. 604 (1903), and cases cited in note 30

supra.
32 Cf. Security Trust Co. v. Appleton, 303 Ky. 328, 197 S.W.2d 70 (1946); North
Adams Nat'l Bank v. Curtiss, 278 Mass. 471, 180 N.E. 217 (1932).
33 278 Mass. 471, 180 N.E. 217 (1932).
34 See In re Beebe's Estate, 52 N.Y.S.2d 736 (Surr. Ct. 1943); In re Adriance's
Estate, 145 Misc. 345, 260 N.Y. Supp. 173 (Surr. Ct. 1932); Saeger Estates, 340 Pa. 73,
16 A.2d 19 (1940). But see The Pennsylvania Co. v. Gillmore, 142 N.J. Eq. 27, 59 A.2d
24 (1948).
35 See Matter of Durston, 297 N.Y. 64, 74 N.E.2d 310 (1947); City Bank Farmers
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interest into conflict with the trust's interest. Thus, a trustee may
not buy securities in his own name and sell them to the trust at
a profit,36 nor use trust funds in any way to make a personal
profit.37 In such cases, the trustee may be surcharged for the profits
he received from the use of trust funds or for any losses incurred
by the trust estate due to his breach.
However, by virtue of his authority to dictate the terms of the
trust, the settlor may specifically vest a trustee with the right to
maintain a conflict of interest in relation to the trust. 38 City Bank
Farmers Trust Co. v. Cannon39 recognized this proposition in exonerating a corporate trustee who purchased and maintained, for
an inter vivos trust, stock in a bank closely affiliated with the trust
company. The evidence disclosed that the settlor, who had retained a life interest in the trust with the power to revoke or
change the remainderman at any time, had insisted that the bank
stock be retained despite the conflict of interest involved. The
court held these factors estopped both the settlor and remainderman from charging the trustee with a breach of duty. However,
Matter of Durston40 indicates that such a result will be reached
only where the permission to maintain the conflict of interest is
explicitly and unambiguously conferred. A divided court in that
case held that an exceedingly broad discretionary clause41 did not
give the corporate trustee the right to retain and purchase its own
stock for the estate. The one dissenting judge felt the broad discretionary language of the will, combined with the knowledge of
the testator that he was appointing as trustee one with divided
loyalty, evidenced an intent to sanction this arrangement. 42 Judging from the general tenor of the cases, a trustee should be extremely wary of relying on the settlor's consent as a basis for placing himself in a position of divided loyalty.

3. Independent Judgment
The trustee must also be wary to some degree of the extent
to which he can rely upon the advice of others, for it is generally
Trust Co. v. Cannon, 291 N.Y. 125, 51 N.E.2d 674 (1943); In re Rees' Estate, 53 Ohio L.
Abs. 385, 85 N.E.2d 563 (Cuyahoga Co. Ct. App. 1949).
See In re Rees' Estate, supra note 35.
See Bowen v. Richardson, 133 Mass. 293 (1882).
38 See Matter of Durston, 297 N.Y. 64, 74 N.E.2d 310 (1947); In re Flagg's Estate,
365 Pa. 82, 73 A.2d 411 (1950).
39 291 N.Y. 125, 51 N.E.2d 674 (1943).
40 297 N.Y. 64, 74 N.E.2d 310 (1947).
41 See 297 N.Y. at 69, 74 N.E.2d at 312.
42 Cf. In re Flagg's Estate, 365 Pa. 82, 73 A.2d 411 (1950).
36
37
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agreed that the trustee has a duty to exercise independent discretion and judgment in making investment decisions, on the theory
that the testator appointed him for this express purpose. 43 This
duty would not prohibit the trustee from seeking the advice of
others nor from ascertaining any preferences which the beneficiaries might have, as long as the final decision was his own. In
re Garland's Will, 44 in which the corporate co-trustee was surcharged for retaining bonds which investigation had shown were
no longer desirable, clearly illustrates the scope of this duty. The
court found that the trustee had breached its duty by retaining
the bonds at the insistence of the settlor's widow, who served as
co-trustee, and held that the corporate trustee was under a duty
to insist upon a sale and, if necessary to overcome the co-trustee's
opposition, to petition the appropriate court for authority to sell.

II.

FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONCERN

WITH UNDULY-CONSERVATIVE TRUST INVESTMENTS

A. I n-fiation
The greatest factor in bringing the problem of conservative
investment to the fore is that of an inflationary economy; 45 for it
is a source of potential harm to income beneficiary and remainderman alike. As to the latter, it decreases the purchasing power of
the trust principal and, if power exists to invade corpus, may also
result in the decrease of its dollar value should the trustee find it
necessary to divert part of the principal to the life beneficiary to
meet the rising cost of living. The income beneficiary suffers from
the decline in purchasing power of the income received, and may
receive even less income, dollar-wise, if the principal shrinks
through repeated invasion. Therefore, it is not surprising that
income beneficiaries have striven with increased vigor to augment
returns from trust investments46 and that remaindermen have likewise sought ways to increase the value of the principal.47
48 See In re Talbot's Estate, 141 Cal. App. 2d 309, 296 P.2d 848 (1956); In re
Garland's Will, 159 Misc. 333, 287 N.Y. Supp. 918 (Surr. Ct. 1936). The reluctance of
the English courts to allow investments in corporate securities may have been partially
due to the trustee's lack of control in corporate management.
44 159 Misc. 333, 287 N.Y. Supp. 918 (Surr. Ct. 1936).
45 The court in In re Mayo, 259 Minn. 91, 105 N.W.2d 900 (1960), was undoubtedly
greatly influenced in its decision to allow deviation from the terms of the trust by the
fact that inflation between 1939 and 1960 had decreased the purchasing power of the trust
corpus by 50%. See text at note 2 supra.
46 Cf. Commercial Trust Co. v. Barnard, 27 N.J. 332, 142 A.2d 865 (1958).
47 Cf. In re Mayo, 259 Minn. 91, 105 N.W .2d 900 (1960); Commercial Trust Co. v.
Barnard, supra note 46.
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Although the problems concomitant with inflation have gained
widespread recognition among writers,48 sharp differences of opinion exist as to whether this factor should affect traditional investment behavior and, if so, in what manner and to what extent.
Differences of opinion may focus upon any one of several disputable points, the most fundamental of which relates to the ques,
tion of whether inflation is merely a short-term phenomenon
which does not merit a substantial revision in trust investment
doctrine. Although at least one writer has questioned whether
inflation in our economy will continue indefinitely,49 most ·writers
at least feel that inflation is too important a factor to be ignored
in the hope it will eventually disappear of its own accord.
In determining the effect of inflation on trust investment doctrine, writers have been forced to come to grips with the related
problem, which has long plagued the courts, of whether the trustee's primary concern should be the preservation of principal or
the securing of income. It is beyond dispute that the trustee has
a duty in formulating investment policy of a twofold nature: first,
a duty to the remainderman to guard against loss of principal,
and, also, a duty to the income beneficiary to secure income from
investments. 50 The courts have rather consistently indicated, however, that the trustee's primary. duty is the preservation of the trust
principal, even if it is necessary to sacrifice income to accomplish
this end.51 Writers have maintained that some courts have unjustly favored the remainderman in their application of this doctrine. 52 In any event, it seems clear that in many situations a court
would do serious injustice to the intent of the settlor or testator
by subordinating his wishes with respect to income to the preservation of trust principal; that is, the life beneficiary (i.e., widow
or incompetent child) is very commonly the person for whom the
48 See Buek, "Qualified" Trustee Performance Calls for Full Investment Freedom, 99
TRusrs & EsTATES 194 (1960); Fingar, Changing Concepts of Trust Investments, 96 TRusrs
& ESTATES 864 (1957); Shattuck, The Trustee's Duty To Invest, 86 TRUSTS & EsTATES 119
(1948); Tenney, The Trustee, the Stock Market and the Measure of Damages, 96 TRusrs
& EsTATES 824 (1957); Torrance, By Growth Obsessed: Balance and Perspective Today's
Need in Trust Investment Policy, 97 TRUSTS & ESTATES 226 (1958); Comment, 39 CALIF.
L. REv. 380 (1951).
49 See Torrance, supra note 48. But see Fingar, supra note 48, at 866.
50 In re Buhl's Estate, 211 Mich. 124, 178 N.W. 651 (1920); The Pennsylvania Co. v.
Gillmore, 137 N.J. Eq. 51, 43 A.2d 667 (Ch. 1945).
51 See In re Buhl's Estate, supra note 50; Brown's Estate, 287 Pa. 499, 135 Atl. 112
(1926); Davis v. Davis Trust Co., 106 W. Va. 228, 145 S.E. 588 (1928). Cf. Miller v. Pender,
93 N.H. 1, 34 A.2d 663 (1943). But cf. The Pennsylvania Co. v. Gillmore, supra note 50.
52 See Fingar, supra note 48, at 864; Shattuck, supra note 48, at 119; Comment, S9
CALIF. L. REv. 380-81 (1951).
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settlor was most interested in providing.53 The prospect of inflation has added a new twist to this old argument, for now shortsighted concern merely for the preservation of principal may seriously injure the interests of the remainderman himself through
loss of purchasing power. Despite this fact, some writers have
argued that the trustee's duty to preserve the trust principal refers
only to the preservation of the dollar value of the trust rather than
to maintain its actual purchasing power. 54 This theory finds support in the analogy that, as the trustee should not risk principal
to gain income, he surely should not risk principal to accumulate
more principal. In answer to the foregoing view, it may be argued
that, even conceding the debatable proposition that trustees are
primarily conservers of wealth, since dollar value in today's inflationary market is of little significance, 55 the only way to conserve
wealth realistically is through preservation of the purchasing
power, and not merely the dollar value, at the trust corpus.
Even if one views inflation as a perpetual phenomenon and the
trustee, at least to the extent of his duties to preserve purchasing
power, as more than a conserver of wealth, there still remains the
question of whether there is a feasible way to compensate for the
effects of inflation. The pm;chase of common stock, in the hopes
that the value of the stock and the income derived from it will
grow at least proportionately to rate of inflation, has been suggested as the only practical way to accomplish this end.56 Yet,
this course of action may be partially or fully foreclosed to trustees in states with some form of statutory legal list. 57 And, even
as to those states applying a "prudent man" standard, some writers have averred that, although common stock may be reasonably
purchased to provide income, such purchases become unreasonably
speculative ventures when made for the purpose of increasing
principal. 58 However, other writers have expressed the view that
the trustee should take inflation into account, and thus it is proper,
within the framework of the reasonable man rule, for him to se53 Cf. Stevenson, supra note 5, at 78.
54 See Headly, Trustees or "Gentlemen Adventurers"!, 88 TRUSTS &: ESTATES 91 (1949);
Torrance, supra note 48.
515 Cf. Shattuck, supra note 48.
1'.iO See Bardt, Selection of Securities, 91 TRUSTS &: ESTATES 742 (1952); Fingar, supra
note 48, at 866; Jennett, Changing Concepts of Trust Investments, 94 TRUSTS &: ESTATES

843 (1955).
57 See text at note

18 supra.

See Headly, supra note 54. Cf. Murray, Common Stocks in Trust, 89 TRUSTS &:
EsTATES 829 (1950). But see Axe, Record of Equity Investment for Trust and Pension
Funds, 89 TRUSTS &: ESTATES 508 (1950), in which the following table was used to show
1i8
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lect common stocks which are not unduly speculative, but which
will serve as a hedge against inflation as well as provide a sound
income; 59 that is, invest in stocks whose past history indicates to
the prudent trustee a high probability of increased valuation and
income in the face of continued inflation.
Summarizing, writers in general have recognized the effects of
inflation on trust investments but differ in their approach to this
problem in at least three significant respects: whether inflation
is a short- or long-term phenomenon; whether, even if the trustee
is regarded as primarily a conserver of wealth, he fulfills his obligations by maintaining the dollar value of the fund in trust, or
whether should he instead attempt to maintain its purchasing
power; whether the purchase of common stock as a hedge against
inflation is inherently speculative or, rather, an effective way
to solve a crucial problem.
B. Declining Rate of Return From Bond Investments

A second factor causing increasing concern with conservative
investments is the declining rate of return from bond investments
coupled with increased returns from attractive common stocks.
The securities investment situation has changed greatly since the
1920's, when few high quality stocks were available and bonds,
on the other hand, were returning in excess of five percent. 00
Although this factor most directly concerns the income beneficiary, it may, of course, affect the interest of the remainderman if
the right to invade principal exists. Thus, the question again
that long-term skillful investments in common stocks, despite possible short-term fluctuations, result in greater income and better protection against inflation than either fixed
income securities or retirement annuities provided by life insurance companies:
Amount
Value of
Ratio of Value
of Cash
Fund at End
of Fund to
Basis of 30 years
Invested
of 30 Years
Cash Invested
I. High-grade fixed-income
securities (present rate of
$3,000,000
4,500,000
2½% per annum)
1.50
2. Retirement annuity plan
of type provided by leading
life insurance companies
3,000,000
4,221,000
1.41
3. Diversified high-grade
common stock (1908-38)
2,999,675
10,331,075
3.44
4. Diversified high-grade
common stock (1918-48)
3,000,825
10,168,875
3.39
59 See Buek, supra note 48, at 194-95; Fingar, supra note 48, at 866; Comment, 39
CALIF. L. R.Ev. 380, 388-93 (1951). Cf. Tenney, supra note 48.
60 See Jennett, supra note 56, at 844. Compare Jennings, Caution in Equity Selection,
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arises whether stocks should be substituted for traditionally safer,
but now lower yielding, bonds.

C. The Growth of the Professional Trustee
One final factor is significant in explaining the recent concern
with unduly-conservative trust investments. This is the growth in
importance, to the point of predominance, of the professional
trustee in the field of trust administration and investment.61 It is
noteworthy that the principal doctrines relating to the investment
of trust funds were developed most significantly at a time when
most trustees were amateurs. 62 Conservative investment by a trustee who is relatively unfamiliar with wise investment practices and
policies is not only justifiable, but is also necessary to give some
degree of protection to the income beneficiary and the remainderman. On the other hand, the professional trustee is almost invariably in a far better position to increase the return for the
income beneficiary and accumulate added principal for the remainderman safely through the discriminating and informed purchase of various securities. His advantage lies both in his greater
experience in extensively investing large amounts of funds and
his access to economic and financial reports, data and statistics
analyzing all relevant investment information. Thus, the emergence of the professional trustee has furnished a strong arguing
point for those alleging that trust law currently imposes an unwarranted degree of conservatism upon trust investment practices.

III.

SAFEGUARDS AGAINST UNDULY-CONSERVATIVE
TRUST INVESTMENTS

Admitting that the factors discussed above impart added significance to the problem of unduly-conservative trust investments,
the question still remains whether trust beneficiaries are in some
way legally safeguarded against such investments. Initially, there
are apparently no court decisions surcharging a trustee on the
ground that he pursued an unduly-conservative investment policy.
Indeed, several of the doctrines of trust law previously examined
would seem to encourage trustees to take a highly conservative
approach to investment practice. An excellent example is the
emphasis placed on the preservation of principal rather than the
61

62

See Tenney, supra note 48, at 824.
See generally Tenney, supra note 48.
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obtaining of income; 63 another is the continued existence in some
jurisdictions of the basically conservative legal list statutes, under
which adherence to the suggested investments guarantees immunity from surcharge. 64 Even the relatively flexible reasonable
man rule to some extent fosters conservatism; for the absence
of definite criteria by which a trustee may determine whether an
investment is speculative may cause him to pursue the more conservative of two possible opportunities in order to avoid the possibilty of being surcharged by a jury using hindsight as its guide.
Despite these tendencies toward conservatism, the reasonable
man rule, properly applied, would seem to provide sufficient safeguards to deter unduly-conservative trust investments. In order
to determine whether a trustee has breached his duty by entering
into an unsound investment, a court will examine all the economic
circumstances at the time the investment was made. By the same
process of examining all the relevant circumstances, courts can
protect beneficiaries from unduly-conservative investments where
it is alleged that a reasonable man would have sought investments
with greater growth potential and higher returns. Among the factors relevant to such a determination, a court should note the
general economic conditions at the time of the making of the
investment, including the prospects of inflation, as the trustee who
today ignores this factor can hardly be deemed reasonable. The
average returns of reputable fixed income and securities investments should also be noted. Apart from these purely economic
considerations, however, a court should also judge the trustee's
actions in light of the settlor's intent; for a policy of highly conservative investment may be entirely consonant with the primary
purpose of the settlor. Thus, if the settlor's widow is the income
beneficiary and the remainderman is unascertained, a reasonable
trustee might well pursue a conservative investment policy, especially where the trust consists of a sizeable principal and the right
of invasion of the corpus is provided for. On the other hand, if
there is no such right of invasion, a trustee would seem to be well
advised to balance the possibility of a slightly greater degree of
risk to principal, but potentially greater return, against the
widow's need for such a return. In reaching a decision, the relationship of the income beneficiary and the remainderman to the
settlor, their respective ages, and the income beneficiary's depend63

64

See text at note 51 supra.
See text at note 18 supra.
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ence upon and need for the tn.1st income should also be taken into
account. Whether professional trustees are or are not involved
should also be a relevant consideration. Besides the experience
and information available to them, the fact that they hold themselves out to the public as being skilled in their profession justifies
the expectation of careful analysis of the market conditions which
should lead to the greatest potential gains without undue risk to
the trust principal. A reasonable professional trustee might well
be expected to reach a far different investment decision than a
person acting without such experience and information.
A reasonable man approach to conservative investments would
seem to be as fair to trustees as would be subjecting them to the
same test for allegedly risky investments. As previously noted, the
rule provides few set guidelines, but, by placing the burden on
those claiming a breach of duty in failing to produce a reasonable
income from the trust or in failing to increase its principal, the
trustee would be safeguarded from surcharge in all but the most
blatant of cases. 65 And, as beneficiaries may be protected from
unduly-conservative investments within the framework of the reasonable man rule, there would seem to be no need to develop
new trust investment doctrines to accomplish this end. 66
One additional approach, suggested as relevant in this area,
deserves at least passing mention. As previously noted, 67 the purchase of sound securities has been advanced as the only practical
way to increase both trust income and principal, and provide a
hedge against inflation. Therefore, it has been suggested that
trust beneficiaries may be protected from unduly-conservative investments by imposing an affirmative duty upon trustees to invest
some portion of the trust assets in common stock. This suggestion
has been repeatedly rejected by writers, and for good cause; 68 such
an approach is inflexible in many of the same respects as are legal
list statutes. 69 It would seem far more realistic to approach the
investment of trust funds with the view that the circumstances
relevant to each individual trust may dictate different investment
65 Commercial Trust Co. v. Barnard, discussed in the text at note I supra, provides
an excellent example of the use of this type of approach. The trustee should be provided
with added protection by examining his action in light of the whole trust portfolio rather
than on an individual investment basis. Cf. Buek, supra note 48.
66 In order for this protection to be universal, it is obvious that the few remaining
states with legal list statutes would have to replace such statutes with "prudent man"
statutes.
67 See text at note 59 supra.
68 See Tenney, supra note 48, at 826-27; Comment, 39 CALIF. L. REv. 380, 391 (1951).
69 See text at notes 26-27 supra.
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policies and that reasonable men may differ as to the details of
these policies, including the amount, if any, 70 to be invested in
securities.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Courts have long attempted to discourage trustees from speculating with the money of others by surcharging them for losses
incurred in such ventures. Although the courts have recognized
a duty on the part of the trustee to produce income from trust
investments, there is no parallel development in the case law surcharging trustees for losses caused by unreasonably conservative
investments. This anomaly in the law has encouraged trustees to
pursue conservative investment policies. At the same time, trust
beneficiaries have been spurred by the emergence of a continuingly inflationary economy, the increased returns of reputable securities, and the development of the professional, usually corporate, trustee to seek protection against losses caused by clearly
overly-conservative investment policies.
It is probably unnecessary to develop new trust law doctrines
to give this needed protection to beneficiaries. Rather, the courts
should make greater use of the reasonable man rule to determine
the validity of an allegedly unduly-conservative investment of trust
funds in the same manner in which the validity of an allegedly
speculative investment is determined. In applying the reasonable
man rule, a court should take into consideration all relevant factors, including market conditions, the settlor's expressed or probable intent, type of trustee involved and the beneficiaries' financial situations. If, after examining all the relevant factors, the
court concludes that a reasonable man in the trustee's position
would not have made such a conservative investment, it would
seemingly be justified in surcharging the trustee for the losses occasioned to the beneficiaries by the unreasonable investment. 71
Lawrence Hirsch, S.Ed.
70 Commercial Trust Co. v. Barnard, discussed in the text at note 1 supra, describes
one set of circumstances in which the refusal to purchase securities was completely
reasonable.
71 Determining the amount of damages may present difficulties in this situation.
The only feasible solution may be to base damages on the average appreciation rate
and income return of similar trust funds. If a court feels that this measure of damages
is too indefinite, it would still be possible to issue a decree ordering the trustee to
change his pattern of investments. See generally Tenney, supra note 48.

